








In this contribution, I aim to show how locating the Platonic dialogues in the intellectual context of their own time can illuminate their philosophical content.​[1]​ I seek to show, with reference to a specific dialogue (the Theaetetus), how Plato responds to other thinkers of his time, and also to bring out how, by reconstructing Plato’s response, we can gain deeper insight into the way that Plato shapes the structure and form of his argument in the dialogue. In particular, I argue that the subtler thinkers (hoi kompsoteroi) discussed by Plato’s Socrates at Tht. 156a3 are Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics. (Recent scholars, such as Giannantoni and Tsouna, have rejected this identification, which was earlier defended by Schleiermacher, Grote, Zeller and Mondolfo.)​[2]​ Further, I claim that, once we recognise that the subtler thinkers are most likely to be the early Cyrenaics, we can make better sense of the scope and content of the arguments Plato puts forward at Tht. 156a - 160e (especially 156a - 157c). Also, I suggest that this identification helps us to understand a crucial part of Tht. 184b - 186e. Here Plato, in exploring the account of perception offered at 156a - 157c, uses the metaphor of the Wooden Horse to illustrate the conception of perception that he attributes to thinkers such as Protagoras and, in my view, the early Cyrenaics, who maintain that knowledge is a form of perception. 

2. The Theaetetus as a peirastic dialogue

On my interpretation, the Theaetetus is a dialogue ad homines. The dialogue, I think, offers answers to the question ‘what is knowledge?’ by constructing ideas that are not characteristic of (the historical) Socrates or of Plato. Rather, the answers provided are the products of Plato’s – and perhaps Socrates’ – engagement with the theories of knowledge that were dominant during their lifetimes. I think here of Protagoras’ relativism and the various epistemological theories formulated, more or less completely, by Aristippus, Euclides and Antisthenes, who were the supposed founders of Socratic ‘schools’: the Cyrenaics, the Megarians and the Cynics, respectively.​[3]​ I take it that Plato’s aim in the Theaetetus is not purely exegetical: rather, he believes that such views were worth investigating philosophically because of their widespread currency and theoretical appeal. In particular, Plato’s Socrates criticises these views because they present knowledge as based exclusively on perception.​[4]​ 
	On this reading, the Theaetetus offers material that is relevant for a historical reconstruction of the ideas of those thinkers, even though Plato presents this evidence in an oblique way, shaped by the overall needs of the argument. The obliqueness with which Plato presents the views of his opponents should not be taken as meaning that these views are only vaguely based on their ideas or that Plato is making them up. I believe that the ideas addressed by Plato’s Socrates in the dialogue have a firm historical basis and that they would have been recognised by Plato’s readers as belonging to specific thinkers. It is true that Plato’s Socrates draws conceptual connections between such views not drawn by the original thinkers; even so, the core of those views is, I claim, historically accurate. This is part of what made a dialogue such as the Theaetetus historically credible to its initial readers. 
	On this interpretation, in the Theaetetus Plato’s Socrates is arguing ad homines, namely against those thinkers who maintained perception-based accounts of knowledge. This explains why the dialogue is aporetic: it provides no answer to the question what knowledge is because its main aim is to refute a certain type of view.​[5]​ This reading of the dialogue goes back a long way in the history of Platonism and appears from time to time in current Platonic scholarship. The Theaetetus was understood in antiquity as a ‘peirastic’ dialogue, namely one written specifically to refute someone’s theories.​[6]​ In his commentary on the Parmenides, Proclus indirectly suggests the view that the whole of the Theaetetus is designed to refute Protagoras’ doctrines, understood as including the theory of perception developed at Tht. 152a2 - 157c3, which is only partly Protagorean.​[7]​ In the third book of the First Principles, Damascius alludes to an interpretation of Socrates’ dream (the philosophical core of the third part of the Theaetetus) that understands it as philosophically centred on Protagorean elements, thus extending the critique of Protagoras right up to the final section of the dialogue.​[8]​ 
	Alcinous, Didaskalikos 4 offers us insight into a different interpretation of the dialogue, according to which the Theaetetus shows what knowledge is not: the dialogue addresses the epistemology of the sensible world, whereas the Sophist is concerned with the knowledge of what is not sensible, namely the Forms. Although this interpretation is different from the sceptical one adopted by the Academics, according to which the dialogue aims to show that knowledge is unattainable, both accounts insist on the refutative character of the dialogue and recognise that there is a serious confrontation in the dialogue between perception-based theories of perception and the approach of Socrates / Plato, a recognition that seems to me crucial for any credible (and historically grounded) reading of the dialogue. Closer to us in time, another interpreter of the Theaetetus who takes it as a battlefield of contrasting ideas about knowledge is Lewis Campbell. In his commentary on the Theaetetus, alongside Protagoras he carefully identifies traces of Megarian, Cyrenaic and Cynic thinking throughout the whole dialogue (1883: xxviii-xli). Recently, Timothy Chappell’s running commentary on the Theaetetus (2004: 62-4, 67-85, 204-12) defends the view that Plato is arguing against empiricist theories of knowledge maintained in his own time. 
	If the Theaetetus is best understood as a peirastic dialogue, where Plato seriously confronts his rivals’ views about perception and knowledge, it will make good sense to try to locate in the dialogue his references to the philosophers whose views he is examining. It is in this context I place my attempt to give reasons for identifying the subtler philosophers of Tht. 156a3 with Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics.

3. The choice of characters: Euclides

Some initial reasons for supporting the reading of the Theaetetus as a dialogue ad homines are provided by Plato’s choice of characters. The dialogue is narrated by a slave of Euclides of Megara to Terpsion, another citizen of Megara, Euclides himself being present at the narration. According to the Phaedo, both Euclides and Terpsion were present on Socrates’ final day, together with Antisthenes. (On that occasion, Aristippus is said to be in Aegina: Phd. 59bc.) The narration of the Theaetetus is also imagined as taking take place in Megara, where Plato seems to have fled after Socrates’ death (DL 2.106). The anonymous commentary on the dialogue remarks that Plato wrote this prologue in order to dedicate a ‘mighty dialogue to a weighty man’ (sc. Euclides: coll. III.50 - IV.6). In addition, at least in one point, the Theaetetus seems to be aimed at an audience from Megara (and Cyrene), or at least one which knew these places well. When pressed by Socrates to defend his friend Protagoras, Theodorus alludes to the story of Sciron, who used to sit on the rocks on the road from Megara to Corinth. Sciron compelled travellers to wash his feet and, while they were doing so, he kicked them over the cliffs into the sea, where an enormous tortoise was waiting to tear their bodies to pieces (Tht. 169a9). The brief allusion seems to point to Socrates’ own fatal end. The fact that the passage refers to a legend of Megara might have made the significance of the passage more obvious to a Megarian reader.​[9]​
	The Theaetetus is thus, in an important sense, the dialogue of Euclides the Megarian, as much as the Phaedo, for instance, is the dialogue of Phaedo.​[10]​ More crucially, the Theaetetus is the dialogue of Euclides, the Megarian, in that there are traces of Megarian thinking throughout the dialogue. Even if one does not accept my view that the Theaetetus is a dialogue aimed at refuting Protagorean and Socratic theories of knowledge, it remains the case that most of the dialogue is taken up by refutation of the definitions of knowledge that Theaetetus proposes. The refutation of these definitions is made mostly through a reductio ad absurdum, namely by initially assuming the validity of what Theaetetus says and then by showing that his definitions lead to absurdity. Thus, for instance, it is shown that man is not the measure because if so, every man would be self-sufficient in knowledge and would not need to be taught; or that movement is not the only principle of reality, because, if so, language would be impossible. Both the dialectical exercise of refuting others’ theories and the logical method through which these refutations are conducted remind us of Euclides’ eristic art and its negative character.​[11]​ Socrates’ references at 164d1 to those clever men (deinoi andres) and to those ‘lovers of contradiction’ (antilogikoi) at 164c10 can also be understood as suggesting Euclides and his followers.
	Moreover, in the Theaetetus at more than one point we seem to be reminded of what are usually described as Megarian paradoxes. Diogenes Laertius (2.108) ascribes to Eubulides ‘many dialectical arguments’, which he cites by name without giving the precise content of each argument.​[12]​ This is perhaps because such arguments were so notorious that they did not need any further specification; it is also very probable, as Döring has argued,​[13]​ that Eubulides did not himself invent them. The Theaetetus shows that at least one of these arguments was, undoubtedly, circulating before Eubulides. I am referring to the enkekalummenos, the Veiled Man. This paradox goes roughly like this. You know your father; you are placed in front of a person covered by a veil: you do not know him. But this person is your father, therefore you both know your father and do not know him.​[14]​ At 165b2-4 we seem to be reminded of this paradox, when Socrates asks Theaetetus the ‘most alarming’ question, namely how it is possible ‘for a man who knows something not to know this thing which he knows’.​[15]​ The example Socrates chooses to illustrate this is that of someone who, ‘clapping his hand over one of your eyes . . . asks whether you see his cloak with the eye that is covered’ (165b9-c2). The analogy between Socrates’ words and the Veiled Man cannot be closer. The same analogy seems also to surface later in the dialogue, when Socrates attempts to explain the phenomenon of false judgement by treating knowing as an alternative to not knowing (188a-c). In Socrates’ accounts of the problem of false judgement, one can find the following statements: ‘If [a man] knows a thing, it is impossible that he should not know it; or if he does not know it, he cannot know it’ (188b1); and: ‘a man certainly doesn’t think that things he knows are things he does not know, or again that things he doesn’t know are things he knows’ (188c2-3). A reference to the Megarian paradox is clearly on display here. 

4. The subtler thinkers

A second choice of character that is illuminating for the ad homines reading of the Theaetetus that I am recommending is, obviously enough, Protagoras. More than half the dialogue is devoted to the discussion of his views, or of views indirectly springing from his maxim that man is the measure of all things. We start off at 151e3 - 152a4 with the identification between Protagoras’ maxim and Theaetetus’ first definition of knowledge as perception. From this identification, a long list of other philosophical theories and ideas follows: Protagoras’ secret doctrine (152d1-e1), Heraclitus’ theory of movement (152e2 - 153d5), the subtler thinkers’ account of perception (156a2 - 157c3), the idea that wisdom is impossible in Protagoras’ world (161c1 - 162a3), a further defence of Protagoras’ views (166a1 - 168c5), the dichotomy between the philosopher and the person in the law-court (172c3 - 177c5). Thus, we really do seem to be overwhelmed (as Socrates points out at 172b9-c1) by a discussion that becomes more intricate as it goes on. 
	In the Theaetetus, Protagoras is clearly a symbol for a whole range of approaches to knowledge that Plato’s Socrates wants to identify as being perception-based. Yet the core of Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine is a fascinating theory of perception that Socrates ascribes to some ‘subtler thinkers’ mentioned at 156a3, who are most likely to be the same as the students of Protagoras identified at 152c10. After giving his initial exposition of Protagoras’ relativism at 151e - 152c, Socrates suggests that Protagoras taught a secret doctrine to some of his pupils (152c10). The content of Protagoras’ secret doctrine is stated briefly at 152d2-e1, expanded at 153d8 - 154b8 and finally presented fully at 156a2 - 157c3, the passage that is most relevant here. The subtler thinkers are contrasted with some unnamed materialists and said to have their own mysteries that Socrates reveals. In accordance with Protagoras’ secret doctrine, these thinkers maintain that everything is in movement (kinēsis) and that there is nothing beyond movement (156a5). They believe that there are two kinds (eidē) of movement, each infinite in extension, one with an active power (to men poiein), and the other with a passive one (to de paschein) (156a6-7). From the intercourse of these two kinds of movement, ‘there come to be offspring, infinite in number, but always twins: one is the perceived thing, the other is the corresponding perception, which is on every occasion generated and brought to birth together with the perceived thing’ (156a7-b2). These perceptions have names such as ‘seeings, hearings’ and so on (sensible perceptions) and ‘pleasures, pains’ and so on (emotions) (156b3-4).
	Socrates then explains how, according to this theory of perception, objects cease being ontologically indeterminate and become determinate (such as coloured) for a perceiver. For instance, a stone does not possess whiteness in itself but it becomes white once the perceiver and the perceived thing have encountered each other so that the perception eventually arises (156c6 - 157a5). It is clear that in this picture there is no room at all for perceptual error: the perceiver is infallibly aware that the stone is white for her. As Socrates put it earlier when discussing the views of Protagoras, ‘perception is always of what is, and free from falsehood, and it is knowledge’ (152c5-6). This is a reason why the subtler thinkers may have been also the disciples of Protagoras: they restate the kind of incorrigibility that his relativism attaches to the perceptions of the individual. 
	Socrates eventually brings in a point about language, when he illustrates further the philosophical implications of the subtler thinkers’ theory of perception: a stone does not possess the whiteness in itself but it becomes white once the perceiver and the perceived object have come across each other and perception eventually arises (156c6 - 157a5). According to the theory, objects are ontologically indeterminate prior to perception. Socrates implies a link with the initial formulation of Protagoras’ Secret Doctrine when he says that, according to the subtler thinkers, it is clear that ‘nothing is one thing just by itself, but things are always coming to be for someone’ (157a8 - 157b1).​[16]​ In the light of this claim, the verb ‘to be’ has to be abolished, as ‘those wise people say’ (157b3-4), and a whole range of new expressions need to be coined. Such new expressions include ‘coming to be’, ‘undergoing production’, ceasing to be’, ‘altering’, instead of terms like ‘something’, ‘someone’s’, ‘my’, ‘this’ (157b4-7). Even the relation of simple denotation is at risk: when we say ‘stone’ or ‘man’, we are using a convention (otherwise our words will not be meaningful); but there is nothing out there in the world, such as a man or a stone. We had better describe such objects simply as aggregates or collections (athroismata) of parts (157b9-c2). 
	The point of the statement about the need for a new language is that, instead of a metaphysics of objects, in the theory of perception endorsed by the subtler thinkers there is a metaphysics of process. This kind of metaphysics is the only one that is able to make good sense of the kind of indeterminacy that lies at the heart of the subtler thinkers’ theory. The only way that things can display a certain ontological character (for example, being white) and can emerge from their intrinsic indeterminacy is by coming into contact with a perceiver at a given time. But this interaction can only be momentary, since it only lasts for a brief period of time; this interaction is also private both to the perceived thing and the perceiver (as Socrates says at 154a2).​[17]​ Since perceivers are many, there are also many ways in which things are perceived. The best way to account for this vast array of conflicting perceptions experienced by different perceivers is to replace the notion of objects with that of processes. This, however, forces the subtle thinkers who endorse this replacement to call for a new language: in place of an object-centred language, there has to be a language based on processes, in which names such as ‘stone’ or ‘man’ are empty terms. These names do not really indicate any ontologically stable and determinate object out there; however, we keep those names as a kind of useful convention in the framework of a new language of processes – otherwise, we would be trapped into a wholly solipsistic world, that is, one private to each perceiver.
	The key ideas in the theory of perception endorsed by the subtle thinkers are, therefore, the following: everything is (in) movement; perceptions are incorrigible and private to the individual perceiver; there is a need for a new language (required by the fact that things are indeterminate). Let us now see whether these ideas are also present in the richest available source for the epistemological thought of the Cyrenaics, namely Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.190-200.

5. Sextus Empiricus on the Cyrenaics

Sextus’ report appears in his survey of the criterion of truth of the dogmatic philosophers. With regard to the Cyrenaics, Sextus says (M 7.191-2):

The Cyrenaics claim that the affections (pathē) are the criteria [of truth] and that they alone are apprehended and are infallible (adiapseustos). None of the things that have caused (tōn pepoiēkotōn) the affections is, conversely, apprehensible or infallible. They say that it is possible to state infallibly and truly and firmly and incorrigibly that we are being whitened (leukainometha) or sweetened (glukazometha), but it is impossible to say that the thing productive of the affection in us is white or sweet , because one may be disposed whitely even by something not-white or may be sweetened by something not-sweet. 

Slightly later (M 7.194-5) he adds:

We must therefore say either that the affections are the phainomena or that the things productive of the affections are the phainomena. If we say that the affections are the phainomena, we will have to maintain that all phainomena are true and apprehensible. If, on the contrary, we say that the things productive of the affections are the phainomena, all phainomena will be false and not apprehensible. The affection occurring in us tells us nothing more than itself. If one has to speak but the truth, only the affection is therefore actually a phainomenon for us. What is external (to d’ektos) and productive of the affection perhaps is a being but it is not a phainomenon for us. We are all infallible with regard to our own affection, but we are all uncertain with regard to the external object (to ektos hupokeimenon). 

Two of the three ideas noted earlier in the theory of perception ascribed to the subtler thinkers of the Theaetetus are obviously present in Sextus’ account: the privacy and incorrigibility of one’s own perception, and the use of a different kind of language, more in accordance with how the world actually is. On the first point, Sextus insists that, for the Cyrenaics, each perception is infallible and incorrigible; indeed, every affection (pathos) is, on the same principle, incorrigibly private to the perceiver undergoing the affection. Again, as in the Theaetetus, the first example that Sextus reports is of an affection of whiteness. The expression that the Cyrenaics were reported to use is ‘to be whitened’ (leukainomai).​[18]​
	With the expression ‘I am being whitened’, the Cyrenaics invented a neologism for capturing the philosophical innovation that was already fully present in the theory of perception ascribed by Plato to the subtler thinkers in the Theaetetus. In the latter theory, as we have seen, much emphasis is put both on the movement that makes every perceptual act momentary and on the dissolution of reality into an indeterminate substratum, where processes replace objects. The tense of the expression, ‘I am being whitened’ may refer to the instantaneousness of the perceptual act: every perception (using the term, aisthēsis, employed in the Theaetetus) or affection (to use the canonical Cyrenaic term, pathos, referred to by Sextus) is limited to the very moment when it takes place. Secondly, and most crucially, the expression ‘I am being whitened’ avoids any reference to the (reality of the) objects causing the perception or affection. Despite the fact that Sextus often uses Sceptical terms to characterise Cyrenaic views, he also describes the objects as ‘causing’ the affections. But I believe that he is just expounding the doctrines of the Cyrenaics by adopting the distinction between appearance and reality. The Cyrenaics may indeed have adopted the same distinction (which was central throughout Greek philosophy), but they ended up by adopting a rather new approach to reality. Despite the fact that Sextus often uses Sceptical terms to characterise Cyrenaic views, he also talks as if the Cyrenaics thought that there really are objects ‘out there’ which ‘cause’ the affections they experience. This, it seems to me, is strictly inaccurate. No doubt the Cyrenaics thought there was some state of affairs external to individual (as all Greek thinkers seem to have assumed); but if it is true, as the subtler thinkers tell us, that this state of affairs is utterly indeterminate and we have only a metaphysics of processes, then the Cyrenaics would not have wanted to use expressions such as ‘object’ which imply a stable or determinate reality.​[19]​ 
	The need to avoid any reference to objects seems to be lurking behind the Cyrenaic view about the conventionality of language, which Sextus briefly reports. Since we are all infallible in our affections but we all make mistakes about the object causing the affections, the Cyrenaics say (M 195-6): 

No criterion is common to human beings, common names are assigned to objects. All in common in fact call something white or sweet, but they do not have something common that is white or sweet. Each human being is aware of his own private affection. One cannot say, however, whether this affection occurs in oneself and in one’s neighbour from a white object.

According to Cyrenaic epistemology, we are incorrigibly aware of our own affections, but we can never know whether the object we perceive as white is white in itself. Neither can we know whether another person perceives the object as white. We do not have either any common affection or access to a common world of objects from which our affections arise. If we had that one world, our affections could still be private to us, but we could compare them with those of others on the basis of an objectively shared element, namely that very world. Since we do not have any common world or common affections, we have to revert to common names, to be assigned conventionally to those qualities, such as white or sweet, that all we, human beings, experience, though with reference to different objects and in different circumstances. 
	Other important analogies can be drawn in this respect too with the Theaetetus. Socrates says there with reference to the theory of the subtler thinkers that ‘nothing is one thing just by itself, but things are always coming to be for someone’ (157a8 - 157b1). Socrates also remarks that, according to the latter theory, we had better not speak of things such as stones or men: there is really nothing in the world out there as such. (What we call ‘man’ or stone’ are aggregates emerging, so to speak, from perceptual processes: 157b9-c2.) Similarly, Sextus points out that, on the Cyrenaic view: ‘what is external and productive of the affection perhaps is a being, but it is not a phainomenon for us’ (M 7.194). On this basis, the Cyrenaics may have maintained that there is something out there but that this is no more than an indeterminate substratum (or hupokeimenon). This substratum, however, is not, on this view, either discrete or made up of objects perfectly identifiable by an essence (in the strong sense of ‘essence’ intended by, for example, Aristotle). There is no ‘essence’ there to be grasped. 
	That is why it makes no sense to say ‘I perceive the stone as white’; it makes much better sense to say ‘I am being whitened’ when I happen to see what we conventionally call a stone. In the Theaetetus, the subtler thinkers are still referring to objects, although their theory implies that there are none and although these thinkers are also made to invoke the invention of a new language, which replaces the language of being with that of becoming and which avoids direct reference to objects as determinate entities. Despite the way that Sextus presents the position, it was probably the later Cyrenaics, rather than Aristippus and the early Cyrenaics, who coined a new language to express both the indeterminacy of the world and the privacy of the individual’s affections.​[20]​
	The detailed comparison I have offered between the theory of the subtler thinkers in the Theaetetus and Sextus’ account of Cyrenaic doctrines has brought out the analogies between the two texts, in particular as regards perceptual incorrigibility, indeterminacy and the need for a new language. The final element in the theory of the subtler thinkers that is worth investigating is the idea that everything is (in) movement. From the intercourse of the two kinds of movement, active and passive, there come to be twin offspring, the perceptions and the corresponding perceived objects. These perceptions have names such as hearings, seeings and pleasures and pains (Tht. 156b4-6). Thus, perceptions are seen as the results of movement and as movements themselves, being themselves subject, as any other thing is, to the law that everything is movement. The reference to pleasures and pains is, in this context, particularly illuminating. According to the subtler thinkers’ theory, in the Theaetetus there has been no reference at all to pleasures and pains as kinds of perception. Why does Plato present these quite naturally as perceptions in the context of the subtler thinkers’ theory? The answer is that, by including pleasures and pains in the category of perceptions, he is here signalling, indirectly, a reference to the Cyrenaics. 
	One of the fundamental tenets of the Cyrenaics, crucial to their ethics, was in fact that the two essential affections characteristic of human beings, namely pleasure and pain, are two movements. As Diogenes Laertius puts it (2.86):​[21]​

The philosophers who followed the teaching of Aristippus and were called Cyrenaics had the following beliefs. There are two affections (pathē), pain and pleasure, pleasure being a smooth motion (leia kinēsis) and pain a rough motion (tracheia kinēsis).

On this basis, we find a striking resemblance between the concepts of pleasure and pain as defined by the Cyrenaics and what the subtler thinkers of the Theaetetus hold about perceptions, including those, such as pleasure and pain, which were not mentioned in the dialogue before the report of the subtler thinkers’ theory of perception. In both theories, pleasure, pain and all other perceptions, or affections, are best understood as (the results of) movements. Perhaps we do not want to go as far as Dümmler, who claimed that the theory of movement that is such an important ingredient in the subtler thinkers’ theory of perception does not have a Heraclitean basis but is, ultimately, Aristippean.​[22]​ Still, the analogies between the ideas ascribed to the subtler thinkers in the Theaetetus and those we recognise as authentically Cyrenaic are so many that it can hardly be a matter of coincidence. 

6. The wooden horse

Thus, there are good grounds for identifying the subtler thinkers of Tht. 156a3 with the early Cyrenaics. In the Theaetetus, Plato cannot name the Cyrenaics directly as having elaborated a set of views about perception of which Protagoras was the founder because at the time the dialogue is set (399 BC) Aristippus and his early followers had not developed their doctrines fully. But the identification of them with the subtler thinkers is, I believe, crucial for understanding Plato’s final critique of the thesis that perception is knowledge (Tht. 184b - 186e). 
	Almost at the end of his lengthy treatment of Protagoras, Heraclitus and the subtler thinkers, after refuting the view that all is movement (179d - 183b), Socrates puts forward his final argument against the identification of knowledge with perception (184b - 186e). Very briefly, the argument goes like this: we perceive a thing as white by means of our sense-organs; by means of these sense-organs, however, we are unable to say whether the object we see as white is identical with something else, whether it is really something, or whether it is similar to something else. In short, by means of the sense organs, we are unable even to conceive of ‘being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, the same and different’ (185c9-10). As Theaetetus puts it: ‘The mind itself (autē . . . hē psuchē), by means of itself (di’ hautēs), considers the things which apply in common to everything’ (185e1-2). There is a clear distinction, Socrates adds, between, on the one hand, perceptions and, on the other, the cognitive operations that the mind makes by itself: truth and being can be grasped by the mind and not by the senses (186c1-10). Since the operations the mind makes by itself in its search for truth and being cannot be performed by perception, the latter has no share in the grasping of being and hence it has no share in the grasping of truth either. Perception therefore cannot be knowledge. 
	What is at the root of this epistemological picture is, plainly, the organising activity that the mind has to perform to account for those properties that are not perceptible, such as identity and similarity. More crucially for us, the mind itself is responsible, on Plato’s account, for organising the various pieces of information that perception, through our sense-organs, provides us with. For this purpose, perception has to be conceptualised. He conveys this view eloquently through the metaphor of the Wooden Horse (184d1-5):

It would surely be strange if we had several perceptions sitting inside us, as if in wooden horses, and it wasn’t the case that all those perceptions converged on some one kind of thing, a mind or whatever one ought to call it: something with which we perceive the perceptible things by means of the senses, as if by means of instruments. 

As the scholia recognise, Plato is here referring to the well-known wooden horse of Troy: no Greek would have missed the reference.​[23]​ It is clear that, in using this metaphor, Plato is not only expounding his view about the relationship between perceptions and mind, but is also indirectly criticising the view that does not recognise fully the fundamental role of the mind in the cognitive process. If we do not recognise this role, we will conceive of ourselves as a kind of wooden horse, with a plurality of perceptions sitting inside us without any organising centre. But, in this case, these perceptions would be (according to Plato’s masterfully evocative suggestion) deceptive ones, as the wooden horse of Troy was deceptive for the Trojans. Their deceptiveness does not consist (as I interpret Plato’s point) in their being false perceptions, but in their being uni-sensorial perceptions, that is, isolated perceptions that simply register an affection of the body without being able to interact epistemologically with other similar perceptions. On this view, perception is simply a unidimensional affection of the body, achieved through the stimulation of the appropriate sense organ. It can hardly be denied that the affection that someone undergoes is true for them; yet, on Plato’s view, the affection is deceptive in so far as it focuses on just one perceptual property of the object. We can see a stone as white; we can sense a stone as hard, but there is no way, according to this theory, to put these two isolated affections into the same epistemological picture (see Tht. 185a1-6).
	By stressing again the epistemological distance between mind and perception, Socrates refers implicitly to this view in two other passages. First, 186b11-c2:

There are some things that both men and animals are able to perceive by nature from the moment they are born: namely all those affections (pathēmata) that, by means of the body, converge on the mind. 

Slightly later, he returns to this point (186d2-5): 

Knowledge is located not in our affections (en tois pathēmasin) but in our reasoning upon these. 

In these two passages, the term Plato uses to refer to the simple alteration of the body in the perceptual process is, strikingly enough, pathos, ‘affection’, and not the more common aisthēsis, by which he has so far described the sensations in the Theaetetus. There are two other passages in the dialogue where Plato uses the term pathos. The first is at 179c3, where Socrates says: ‘if we focus on the momentary affection (pathos) each of us has, from which there come to be his perceptions and the judgements which conform to them – well, it is harder to refute these latter as not being true’ (179c2-4). In another passage, Protagoras is made to ask whether it is possible that ‘a man’s present memory of an affection (pathos) which he has experienced in the past but is no longer experiencing is the same sort of affection as he then had’ (166b2-4).
	In the latter passage, the point made by Socrates forms part of an argument designed to show how teaching will not be possible if one is incorrigibly correct in one’s affections. (This is seen as one of the main upshots of the subtler thinkers’ theory of perception.) The relationship between the affection and its memory is the core theme of the passage. Socrates denies the possibility that the memory of the affection is the same affection as was experienced earlier. This point sounds undoubtedly Cyrenaic: Aristippus, famously, denied any value to the memory of past pleasures on the grounds that what counts is the pleasurable affection of the moment (however long this may be) and that we cannot recreate the affection of past pleasures as this was originally experienced.​[24]​ Curiously enough, another passage of the Theaetetus (184b - 186e) may be relevant here. Theaetetus remarks that, as far as good and bad are concerned, the mind considers their existence ‘in relation to one another, calculating in itself things past and present in relation to future’ (186b1). Thus, the mind is able to provide the kind of linkage between what is good and bad in the past, present and future that Aristippus, by grounding his ethics on the pleasure of the moment (namely on the transitory affection of the body) was not able to provide. 
	These analogies between the Theaetetus and other sources on the Cyrenaics, together with the use of the key term pathos in the wooden horse section (in place of the more common aisthēsis) may, once again, point towards the identification of the subtler thinkers and the early Cyrenaics. In his critique of the thesis identifying perception with knowledge, Plato is, in my interpretation, in effect arguing specifically against a position stated and defended earlier in the dialogue (156a2 - 157c3), namely the full-scale identification of perception and knowledge. This passage is, without doubt, the one where the subtler thinkers, who were the front-runners of perceptual subjectivism and relativism in Plato’s time, propose their theory of perception. In showing the unavoidable role of the mind in cognitive processes, including perceptual processes, Plato is at the same time showing the main weakness of the account of perception he has so far been confronting. On this account, namely the one defended by the subtler thinkers at 156a2 - 157c3, a perception is simply an affection; we can grant to such affections (to use the term that appears most in 184b - 186e) or perceptions (to use the term that appears most in 156b - 157c) their incorrigibility and we cannot properly say they are false. Yet these affections or perceptions are unable to tell us anything about properties such as identity, similarity and being that only the mind is able to grasp. Even worse, as Plato argues, affections and perceptions, conceived in Cyrenaic terms, are uni-sensorial events, with no residual capacity to be elaborated into a perceptual picture that pulls together the unidimensional information provided by the different sense-organs into a coherent whole.




That Plato’s main target in the Wooden Horse section is the Cyrenaic account of affection, which earlier in the dialogue (156a2 - 157c3) is ascribed to the subtler thinkers, is clear also from two other important sources on Cyrenaic thought. In his critique of Cyrenaic epistemology, Aristocles first criticises the idea, which forms part of the subtle thinkers’ theory of perception, that subjects and objects of perception do not exist independently of each other by remarking, in Aristotelian fashion (Aristocles T5 Chiesara, at Eus., PE 14.19.3-4):​[26]​

These three things must necessarily coexist, the affection itself, what causes it, and what undergoes it. He who apprehends the affection must necessarily perceive also what undergoes it. For he will not know that something, for example, is warm, without knowing whether it is himself or a neighbour, now or last year, in Athens or Egypt, someone alive or dead, a man or a stone. 

Secondly, he adduces an argument on the self-consciousness of affections that is very close to Plato’s argument in the Wooden Horse metaphor. In the same passage, Aristocles asks (T5 Chiesara at Eus., PE 14.19.5):

How will he [the man with an affection] be able to say that this is pleasure and that pain? Or that he had the affection by tasting, by seeing, or by hearing? And by tasting with his tongue, seeing with his eyes and hearing with his ears?

With such questions, Aristocles suggests, I believe, that simple Cyrenaic affections are impossible to have without a proper organ that is ultimately responsible for organising the data provided by the sense organs.​[27]​ This is Plato’s main point in the Wooden Horse metaphor. In providing two counter-arguments which can be read as directed against the arguments contained in two sections of the Theaetetus (156b - 157c and 184b - 184e), Aristocles confirms the philosophical linkage between the two sections of the dialogue, sections on which we have been so far concentrating and which, even on Aristocles’ reading, expound Cyrenaic views. 
	A last passage strengthening the suggestion that in Tht. 184b - 186e Plato is, among other things, elaborating his critique of a Cyrenaic theory of perception is the earliest source on the thought of the Cyrenaics, namely the account of the Epicurean Colotes, as preserved by Plutarch. Plutarch reports Colotes’ view on the epistemology of those philosophers (Against Colotes 1120CD): 

[The Cyrenaics], placing all affections and all sense-impressions in themselves, believed that the evidence coming from them was not sufficient, as far as assertions on external objects are concerned. Distancing themselves from external objects, they shut themselves up within their affections as in a siege (eis ta pathē katekleisan hautous en poliorkia). In doing so, they adopted the locution ‘it appears’ but refused to say in addition that ‘it is’ with regard to external objects. 

In these few words, Colotes is made to report the kernel of Cyrenaic epistemology: only affections are knowable, and incorrigibly true. What is striking, however, is how he describes such a position: the Cyrenaics are said to ‘shut themselves up within their affections as in a siege’. This, undoubtedly, reminds us of Plato’s Wooden Horse, which in turn would have reminded any Greek, including Colotes, of the siege par excellence in Greek legend, that of Troy. I suspect that what is behind Colotes’ image of the siege is, in fact, Plato’s wooden horse metaphor. 
	In this metaphor, Plato speaks of a plurality of perceptions sitting inside us as though in wooden horses; in using this metaphor, I have argued, he implies that perceptions are deceptive in so far as they are partial and need to be elaborated further by the mind. These deceptive perceptions are the same affections that Colotes speaks of in the passage just reported. By accepting only the evidence of the affections of the individual and by refusing to make any statement about how the world out there really is, the Cyrenaics, Colotes argues, are deceived by themselves, in so far as they believe as incorrigibly true what they sense: these affections are deceptive, since they do not say anything about the real objects (and their actual properties) causing the affections. The best image able to capture this state is that of a siege; this metaphor is as evocative as the Wooden Horse image. The latter draws its inspiration from the former and points in the same direction: in both cases, the ultimate responsibility for the deceit is the fact that the perceiving subject adopts a Cyrenaic type of epistemology. This is plainly evident in the passage by Colotes and also in the Theaetetus passage (Tht. 184d1-5): by comparing individuals to Trojan wooden horses, Plato makes clear that the siege for the individual is brought out by the individual himself. 
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